“I’m still the same coach and I still rely on the players. We try to make sure that they do what we’ve asked them to, but they’re the ones on the pitch. We contribute through substitutions and we do what we can, but we depend on the players.”
is quick to shift the spotlight away from his role in Argentina’s success story. He is a players’ coach. In his view, without the players, there’s no game, and they deserve all the credit. They’re the ones who have placed in this privileged and unprecedented position, one unlike any the nation has occupied in its footballing history. While he may downplay his role, the truth of the matter is difficult to dispute: few coaches have prepared World Cup matches as effectively as Scaloni. A review of his 14 World Cup matches reveals remarkably few tactical missteps, even when the result has gone against La Albiceleste.
Argentina has a defined style of play: they take initiative, control possession, move the ball quickly and combine effectively through the middle. They also tend to adapt their approach, unlike their opponents Spain, the other finalists, whose tactical set-up has varied very little. In contrast, Argentina have reinvented themselves several times with Scaloni at the helm, based on the strengths of the squad and the characteristics of the opponents.
Argentina’s coaching staff, which includes Matías Manna, in charge of tactical analysis, Walter Samuel, set-piece specialist, Roberto Ayala, defensive coach, and Pablo Aimar, Scaloni’s trusted assistant, identified key weaknesses in Saudi Arabia’s back four, who tended to hold a very high line, leaving space behind.
As a result, Argentina shifted towards a more direct style. With Leandro Paredes and Rodrigo De Paul anchoring midfield and Ángel Di María, Lionel Messi, Lautaro Martínez and Alejandro Gómez leading the attack, La Albiceleste largely moved away from structured positional play. Instead, they looked to exploit space in behind the back line. After Messi opened the scoring, Scaloni’s men found the net three more times before half-time using the same approach, only for each goal to be ruled out by the semi-automated offside system. Though they lost the match, it offered an early glimpse of Scaloni’s willingness to adapt his game plan based on that of the opposition.
After Argentina struggled against Saudi Arabia and played a tense and cagey match against Mexico, the tie against Poland encapsulated Scaloni’s approach. He made a number of changes to the midfield, starting Enzo Fernández, Alexis Mac Allister and Julían Álvarez, who had been viewed as valuable alternatives and who would emerge as some of the tournament’s standout performers.
He also dropped some of the high-profile players like Paredes and Lautaro Martínez from the starting XI. This change to the squad’s set-up marked one of the biggest turning points in the tournament. Scaloni chose to forego some of the most established names to build a midfield that would come to define an era.
Scaloni switched to a 3-5-2 formation to mirror his Dutch counterpart’s system. In the back were Cristian Romero, Nicolás Otamendi and Lisandro Martínez, whose comfort in possession allowed Argentina to vary their build-up patterns. On the flanks, Nahuel Molina and Marcos Acuña provided the width needed to match a Dutch side that relied heavily on wing-backs Denzel Dumfries and Daley Blind, both of whom regularly pushed forward an operated like wingers. In the centre of the pitch, it was the quality and balance of the trio of Mac Allister, Enzo Fernández and De Paul that proved decisive, giving Argentina a level of control the Netherlands struggled to match.
Scaloni’s approach was akin to a game of chess, built around individual matchups across the pitch. In those contests, Argentina held one trump card: Messi. Protected by an imperious back three that rarely put a foot wrong over the 90 minutes, the wing-backs were given licence to join the attack and repeatedly link up with the number 10. They reaped the fruit of their labour almost immediately when Molina arrived unmarked in the box to score the opening goal and Acuña earned a penalty that Messi converted to make the scoreline 2-0.
In a departure from anything Argentina had tried previously in the tournament, Scaloni recognised that Croatia’s midfield dominance, led by Luka Modrić, could be countered through a numerical advantage in the centre of the pitch. He deployed his usual midfield trio and added Paredes. With Messi dropping deeper to influence play, Argentina found space across the pitch and advanced to the final with remarkable ease.
“When we knew we were playing France, and from having watched them against Morocco [in the semi-final], we had it clear in our minds that Ángel Di María was going to play on the left. We didn’t tell the team until an hour before the game, and that was the key to it I think, because we didn’t give anyone the chance to find out about it. Everyone knows everything these days, and it can be counterproductive,” Scaloni told FIFA.
Argentina lined up in a 4-4-2 formation, with Di María operating on the opposite side from where he had spent most of his career. According to Argentina’s architect, the plan had three key objectives.
The first was that France was playing with only three defenders when in possession, with the left-back (Theo Hernández or Eduardo Camavinga) pushing into the midfield and Jules Koundé operating as a right-sided central defender. That meant space and opportunities, which is where Di María came in.
The second was the need to take control of the inside channel that Antoine Griezmann had made his own throughout the tournament. The man handed that task was Alexis Mac Allister.
The third was how to mark Mbappé, the most dangerous forward in the world. “What we didn’t want was Cuti [Cristian Romero] covering Mbappé, or rather Cuti covering Molina and coming out to the flank. We wanted Cuti to be inside with Giroud and Rodrigo covering or Enzo [Fernández] doing it if he had to,” said Scaloni.
With Paredes still working his way back to peak condition, Scaloni reshaped the side into a 4-4-2 set-up, introducing Thiago Almada on the left. As had been the case during South American qualifying, Almada functioned as an ideal link between the deeper midfielders and the forwards. Although his influence diminished later in the tournament, against Austria he showcased his quality, including a clever non-touch assist that helped create Messi’s opening goal. With Almada, Argentina gained greater dynamism and improved positioning between the lines, allowing players to face forward even in congested areas.
Against Thomas Tuchel’s England, Scaloni made his first major tactical change of the tournament, leaving De Paul out of the line-up and abandoning the approach of having similar profiles in the midfield. Including Giuliano Simeone on the right wing, gave Argentina greater physicality and, more importantly, additional width. As a result, Mac Allister, Fernández and Paredes found more space, allowing La Albiceleste to return to its preferred method of attacking through the inside channels. With the addition of Simeone, the squad gained in intensity and provided a threat out wide through his speed.
Almost no Argentina match has looked like the one before, and Scaloni isn’t wedded to a single way of winning. At a time when many coaches prefer to stick to a philosophy than to prioritise the facts in front of them, Argentina’s competitive edge lies in their ability to adapt to the situation while remaining true to their very distinct style of play.
Sources: FIFA Official
